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IMBALANCE ATTRACTORS FOR A STRATEGIC MODEL OF
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE
TED THEODOSOPOULOS AND MING YUEN
Abstract. In this paper we extend the series of our studies on the proper-
ties of an interacting particle model for market microstructure. In our earlier
work we defined a Markov process on the majority opinion of the agents, ob-
tained the transition probabilities and analyzed the martingale properties of
the ensuing wealth process. Here we relax the assumption on the choices of
individual agents by allowing mixed strategies, offering opportunities for the
agents to gain intermediate submartingale exposure for their individual wealth
processes. We develop a novel two-dimensional spin system to model the crit-
ical regions of the wealth process as a reflection of the agents’ behaviors. We
exhibit strategic conflicts between individual market participants and the mar-
ket as a whole, and identify a new source of uncertainty arising from ‘reinforced
expectations’.
1. Introduction
A series of interacting particle models have been proposed over the past decade
to describe the dynamics of agent-based market microstructure models [1, 3, 6, 8, 9].
Often, these models use techniques from non-equilibrium statistical mechanics to
investigate the tradeoff between the safety of trend following and the necessity of
anticipating the majority in order to generate profits [4, 5, 2, 10].
In our earlier work, we extended such a spin market model, originally intro-
duced by Bornholdt et.al. [7], and characterized analytically its invariant measure.
Also, we investigated the aggregate market wealth dynamics [12]. This work led
to an appreciation of the asymmetry between different quasi-stable supply-demand
imbalance levels.
The current paper extends the earlier framework by allowing the agents, with a
certain probability, to choose strategically their next action, rather than be subject
to the Hamiltonian dynamics on the space of spin configurations.
In our revised model we extend the state space of our Markov Chain to include
a set of supply/demand imbalance levels which represent the market participant’s
expectations. The resulting hybrid dynamics represent a mixture of the original
hamiltonian stochastic dynamics presented in [11] and the strategic dynamics of
these expectation sets. We use this setting to investigate the concept of strategic
stability that we introduced in [12] and discover situations where the individual
agent’s strategies are in conflict with the overall market interest. This finding
provides a setting in which to investigate the social benefits of market coordination.
Furthermore, the extended stochastic process we introduce here possesses regimes
of non-unique invariant measure. We interpret the resulting path dependence as an
example of reinforced belief dynamics, whereby an arbitrary choice attains physical
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importance purely because a sufficient number of agents share it. Such ‘self fulfill-
ing prophecies’ are a hallmark of the strongly interacting nature of markets, and
constitute a main ingredient of any behavioral market model. It is our hope that
the current model can help bridge the conceptual gap between physically motivated
spin market models and their behavioral counterparts.
2. A Two-Dimensional Spin Process
In this study, we modify the spin market model presented in [11]. Specifically,
we will allow each agent to act strategically (in a sense to be defined below) with
a fixed exogenous probability q. Let X denote the set of spin configurations on a
lattice on the d-dimensional torus1 Y
.
= (Z/L)d ⊂ T d, i.e. X ⊂ {−1, 1}Y , for an
appropriately chosen L so that |Y | = N . It is convenient to identify the elements
of Y with unique labels from the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. Formally, we accomplish this
by choosing a homeomorphism ϕ : Y −→ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
The state space of our revised process is X = X×X where the second component
of a typical state (ζ1, ζ2) represents a subset G ⊂ Y , i.e. y ∈ G ⇐⇒ ζ2(y) = 1.
This can be seen as the assignment of a ‘two-dimensional spin’ to the lattice Y , i.e.
X ∋ ~ζ : Y −→ {−1, 1}2.
The path of a typical element of X is given by η : Y × (0,∞) −→ {−1, 1}2 and
each site x ∈ Y is endowed with a (typically ℓ1) neighborhood N (x) ⊂ Y it inherits
from the natural topology on the torus T d. As before, for each x ∈ Y , N (x) is a uni-
formly chosen random subset of Y , of cardinality 2d. To be more precise, for a set A
and a positive integer k, let F (A, k) =
{
(a1, a2, . . . , ak) ∈ Ak|ai 6= aj ∀i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k
}
.
Then, for any x ∈ Y , let {N (x, ·)} be a family of iid uniform random variables tak-
ing values in F (Y \ {x}, 2d).
We construct a continuous time Markov process with transitions occurring at
exponentially distributed epochs, Tn, with rate 1. We proceed as before to construct
a transition matrix for the spins, based on the following interaction potential:
h(x, Tn) =
∑
y∈N (x,n)
η1(y, Tn)− αη1(x, Tn)N
−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y∈Y
η1(y, Tn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where α > 0 is the coupling constant between local and global interactions. As
discussed in [11], observe that, as a result of the neighborhood randomization pro-
cedure we introduced, h(x, t) depends only on the first dimension of the spin at x,
η1(x, t), and N
+(t)
.
=
∑
x∈Y [η1(x, t) ∨ 0], i.e. the total number of positive spins.
Specifically, consider two independent families of iid hypergeometric random vari-
ables, {U1, U2, . . .} and {V1, V2, . . .}, with parameter vectors (N − 1, i− 1, 2d) and
(N − 1, i, 2d) respectively. Then, for t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1 ), define
h+1(i, t) = 2(Un − d)− α
∣∣∣∣ 2iN − 1
∣∣∣∣
h−1(i, t) = 2(Vn − d) + α
∣∣∣∣2iN − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
We see that, conditional on {N+(Tn−1) = i}∩{η1(x, Tn−1) = ±1}, the distribution
of h(x, Tn) is the same as that for h±1(i, Tn).
1We use the notation T d to denote the object S1 × . . .× S1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
.
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The flips of the first spin dimension are governed by:
ρab(q, β, i, t) =
[
ai
N
+
1− a
2
]{
q
1 + exp[−2bβha(i, t)]
+
(1− q)
[
1 + bη2(ϕ
−1(i), t)
]
2
}
,
where (a, b) ∈ {−1, 1}2 and β is the normalized inverse temperature. At time Tn
(i.e. the nth epoch) a random site Jn is chosen uniformly from Y . The variables
ρab are interpreted as the resulting flip probabilities for the first spin dimension of
Jn, i.e.
ρab = Pr
(
η1(Jn, Tn−1) = a & η1(Jn, Tn) = b
∣∣Bn−1 ∩ {N+(Tn−1) = i}) .
If we let
X¯n =
η1(Jn, Tn)− η1(Jn, Tn−1)
2
= N+(Tn)−N
+(Tn−1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
we have
Pr
(
X¯n = a
∣∣Bn−1 ∩ {N+(Tn−1) = i}) = ρ−a,a(q, β, i, Tn).
As stated so far, the transition probabilities of X¯ (and therefore N+) could be
random. In particular, for t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn) , even though ha(i, t) is measurable with
respect to Bn−1, η2(ϕ−1(i), t) isn’t generically
2. In order to describe the transition
probabilities for the second component of our stochastic process, we need to define
the wealth process [12]:
W (y, Tn)
.
=
{
W (y, Tn−1) for Jn = y;
W (y, Tn−1) + η1(y, Tn−1)∆P (Tn) otherwise.
,
where W (y, 0) = K(y), representing the initial capital available to agent y, and
∆P (Tn)
.
= P (Tn)− P (Tn−1) is the price change at the nth epoch. In what follows,
we will allow a more general price impact function than in our earlier models, as
follows:
∆P (Tn) = P (Tn−1)f
(
X¯n, N
)
,
where f is a function that maps transient supply/demand imbalances X¯n to price
shocks. The only assumptions we make about this impact function f is that it is
nondecreasing in the first argument and nonincreasing in the second argument, and
that it maps the balanced market to the fundamental price, i.e. f(0, N) = 0. In
what follows, we use γ to denote the ratio of the price impact of an incremental seller
to that of an incremental buyer, i.e. γ = f(−1,N)
f(1,N) ≤ 0, suppressing its dependence
on N for convenience.
Let P βab(i) be independent random variables, identically distributed with the iid
family ρab(1, β, i, ·). These represent the purely stochastic transitions of the first
spin dimension investigated in [11]. Using them, we define
Eβa (i) = P
β
−a,a(i) + γP
β
a,−a(i),
which is a random variable so long as β <∞, inheriting the randomness of h±1(i, ·).
On the other hand, as discussed in [11], in the frozen phase of this process, almost
2This is because, for t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn) , the distribution of ha(i, t) is determined by N+(Tn−1),
while, for β < ∞, the distribution of ρab (and therefore Pab and Ea) depend also on whether an
agent with Hamiltonian ha has spin +1 or −1, which is a Bernoulli random variable
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surely,
(2.1) E+(i)
.
= lim
β→∞
Eβ+(i) =
(
1−
i
N
)
Pr (h−1(i, ·) > 0) +
γi
N
Pr (h+1(i, ·) < 0) ,
which is not random.
The role that ρ played for the transitions of the first spin dimension will now be
played by λ for the second spin dimension. Specifically, for (a, b) ∈ {−1, 1}2 and
t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn) , let
λab(q, β, x, t) = Pr
(
aEβ+(ϕ(x)) + ab
(
1−
1
q
)(
1−
ϕ(x)
N
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣Bn−1 ∩ {η2(x, Tn−1) = a}
)
.
Note that the event Eβ+(i) = −b
(
1− 1
q
) (
1− i
N
)
, which occurs generically with
probability zero, would be added to the computation of λaa, i.e. the probability
of not flipping the second spin dimension. The variables λab are interpreted as
the flip probabilities for the second spin dimension of at the nth epoch, i.e. for
t ∈ [Tn−1, Tn) and all x ∈ Y ,
λab(q, β, x, t) = Pr (η2(x, Tn) = b |Bn−1 ∩ {η2(x, Tn−1) = a}) .
3. Convergence Results
Observe that, unlike the first spin dimension, the second one is updated syn-
chronously for all sites. Furthermore, using (2.1) we see that in the frozen phase,
λab ∈ {0, 1}, because E
β
+ is no longer random. In particular, let
B =
{
x ∈ Y |Eβ+ (ϕ(x)) ≥
(
1−
1
q
)(
1−
ϕ(x)
N
)}
and
C =
{
x ∈ Y |Eβ+ (ϕ(x)) ≤
(
1−
1
q
)
ϕ(x)
N
}
,
A1 = B ∩ C
c , A2 = B ∩ C , A3 = B
c ∩ Cc and A4 = B
c ∩ C.
Then:
Theorem 3.1. There are four distinct behaviors for η2:
x ∈ ϕ−1 (A1) =⇒ η2(x, t) = 1 for t ≥ T1
x ∈ ϕ−1 (A4) =⇒ η2(x, t) = −1 for t ≥ T1
x ∈ ϕ−1 (A2) =⇒ η2(x, t) = η2(x, T0) for t ≥ T0
x ∈ ϕ−1 (A3) =⇒ η2(x, t) = −η2(x, Tn−1) for t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1) and n > 0.
The third case entails path dependence, while the fourth leads to oscillating behavior.
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In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the frozen phase (β → ∞). Let
Pab(i) = limβ→∞ P
β
ab(i). As we saw in [11],
P¯++(i) = P¯−−(i) = 0 if i 6∈
[
N
(
1
2 −
d
α
)
, N
(
1
2 +
d
α
)]
P¯++(i) =
2d∧i∑
j=(d+c)∨(i+2d−N)
f+(i, j) if i ∈
[
N
(
1
2 −
d
α
)
, N
(
1
2 +
d
α
)]
P¯−−(i) =
(d−c)∧i∑
j=0∨(i+2d−N)
f−(i, j) if i ∈
[
N
(
1
2 −
d
α
)
, N
(
1
2 +
d
α
)]
P++ =
i
N
P¯++, P+− =
i
N
(
1− P¯++
)
, P−− =
(
1−
i
N
)
P¯−−,
P−+ =
(
1−
i
N
)(
1− P¯−−
)
with
c =
⌈
α
∣∣∣∣ iN − 12
∣∣∣∣
⌉
, f+(i, j) = C
i−1
j
CN−i2d−j /C
N−1
2d f−(i, j) = C
i
j
CN−i−12d−j /C
N−1
2d
and Cnk denoting the combinations n choose k.
Let
π∞(ℓ) = lim
β→∞
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
N+ (Tn) = ℓ
)
.
The following theorem describes the invariant measure of N+ in this new two-
dimensional spin process, extending Proposition 1 from [11]:
Theorem 3.2. When A2 ∪ A3 = ∅ there is a unique invariant measure for N
+
given by:
g(ℓ) = CNℓ
ℓ−1∏
j=0
1− qP¯−−(j)− (1− q)χA4(j)
1− qP¯++(j + 1)− (1− q)χA1(j + 1)
if ℓ > 0 and g(0) = 1
Z(N) =
N∑
i=1
g(i)
π∞(ℓ) = (1 + Z(N))
−1
g(ℓ) if 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ N and 0 otherwise
On the other hand, when A3 = ∅ but A2 6= ∅, the invariant measure described
above is not unique, because η2(·,∞) on A2 depends on η2(·, 0). In this case, any
measure of the form above, substituting A4 with A4 ∪ {η2(·, 0) = −1} and A1 with
A1 ∪ {η2(·, 0) = +1}, will be invariant under the two-dimensional spin process.
Thus there are 2|A2| different invariant measures, one for each assignment of ±1
to the second spin dimension of the points in A2.
Finally, when A3 6= ∅, no invariant measure exists for the two-dimensional spin
process, because η2 never settles for the points in A3.
Figure 1 shows how the invariant measure varies as we decrease q away from
1. The case q = 1, which was treated in [11], always led to symmetric tri-modal
distributions. Here we observe that even a modest amount of strategic interaction
leads to pronounced skew in the invariant measure.
The bottom two frames of figure 2 show how the existence and uniqueness of
the invariant measure described in Theorem 3.2 above depend on the value of q
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Figure 1. Skewing of the invariant measure as a result of the
inclusion of q 6= 1 (γ = −0.7, α = 4.1, N = 128 and d = 2).
(we will return to the top frame of figure 2 in section 4). Specifically we see that
there is typically a contiguous range of small enough values of q for which the
invariant measure does not exist. Thus, when strategic interactions dominate the
market, agents expectations of desirable levels of supply/demand imbalance never
settle down, indefinitely forcing the agents to chase unattainable majority/minority
levels.
On the other hand, there are islands of non-uniqueness throughout the range of
q values, brought on by intermittent occupation of A2. Except for sufficiently low
values of q, the non-uniqueness is driven by very few (often only one) imbalance
level whose status as desirable (or not) is determined by the initial conditions. The
resulting path dependence propagates throughout the invariant measure.
For instance, as we can see in figure 2, the case q = 0.7 leads to a non-unique
invariant measure because there is one imbalance level (it turns out to be N+ = 61)
which is mapped by η2 in A2. The two resulting invariant measures are shown in
figure 3. As we see, the flip of a single η2 value in the initial conditions leads to more
than double the limiting probability for a substantial range of seller-dominated im-
balance levels. In fact, all imbalance levels are impacted by at least a few percentage
points relative change in the limiting distribution. This phenomenon can be inter-
preted as a sort of fad dynamic, a positive feedback of reinforced expectations with
a surprisingly global and persistent effect.
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Figure 2. Existence, uniqueness and martingale property of the
invariant measure as a function of q.
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Figure 3. The two invariant measures for γ = −0.7, α = 5,
N = 128, d = 2 and q = 0.7. The non-uniqueness is driven by
η2
(
ϕ−1(61, 0)
)
= ±1.
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Figure 4. Dependence of π∞ ([i
∗ − 2, i∗ + 2]) on α and γ, where
i∗ = argmaxi∈[0,N ] π∞(i).
The invariant measure changes qualitatively as γ decreases towards −1 and α
increases. Specifically, more symmetric price impact (γ ց −1) leads to a steeper
concentration of measure as q decreases away from 1. In particular, as we increase
the strategic interaction of the agents, all but one of the modes decrease rapidly,
effectively concentrating the limiting distribution around the global mode. This is
shown in figure 4, which depicts the concentration of limiting probability within
two imbalance levels of the global mode.
On the other hand, increasing the overall coupling constant (αր∞) moves the
modes closer together without attenuating their height, until they are eventually
merged. The transition to unimodal limiting distribution occurs at the ‘kink’ in
the right most column of graphs in figure 4, for the value of q which minimizes the
concentration of measure phenomenon. This effect is shown in figure 5.
Multimodal invariant measures imply the existence of distinct imbalance at-
tractors. Invariant measures more concentrated around their global mode imply
markets with narrower price fluctuations. Therefore, even modest increases in the
amount of strategic interaction among the agents quickly decrease the spread and
complexity of the resulting price fluctuations. Moreover, this effect becomes more
pronounced for more symmetric impact functions and more loosely coupled (less
frustrated) agents.
There also exist situations in which the invariant measure exhibits exceptional
sensitivity to the amount of strategic interaction among the agents. Figure 6 shows
an example of this phenomenon. This radical shift in the imbalance attractor, from
an average value of 10.84 at q = 0.11 to an average value of 87.71 at q = 0.12! Such
large scale rebalancing of the invariant measure is likely to lead to discontinuous
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Figure 5. Disappearance of bimodality as q ր 1 for large α (γ =
−0.9, α = 100, N = 128, d = 2). The bottom frame is a blowup
around the global mode of the invariant measure.
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Figure 6. Discontinuous transition of invariant measure for mod-
est change in the proportion of strategic interaction q (α = 5, γ =
−0.9, N = 128, d = 2).
jumps in the resulting price process, due solely to a slight decrease in the strategic
component of the interaction potential.
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4. The Wealth Process Revisited
We are now interested in characterizing the martingale properties of W (y, ·) as
well as the aggregate wealth, W , defined as
W (Tk) = W (Tk−1) + ∆P (Tk)
∑
y∈Y
η1(y, Tk−1)
= W (Tk−1) + ∆P (Tk)
[
2N+(Tk−1)−N + X¯k
]
.
Using (2.1), after some algebra we arrive at
E [W (y, Tk)−W (y, Tk−1) |Bk−1 ] =(4.1)
= −η1(y, Tk−1)f(1, N)P (Tk−1)
(
1−N−1
) (
1 + γ−1
)
E+
(
N+Tk−1
)
and
E [W (Tk)−W (Tk−1) |Bk−1 ] = −f(1, N)P (Tk−1)
(
1 + γ−1
)
(4.2) {[
2N+(Tk−1)−N + 1
]
P−+ + γ
[
2N+(Tk−1)−N − 1
]
P+−
}
.
Using the invariant measure from Theorem 3.2 we can define 〈∆Wk〉∞ as the ex-
pectation, under the invariant measure π∞, of the expected wealth increment at
the kth transaction time:
〈∆Wk〉∞ = −f(1, N)P (Tk−1)
(
1 + γ−1
)
(1 + Z(N))−1
N∑
ℓ=0
g(ℓ) {[2ℓ−N + 1]P−+(ℓ) + γ [2ℓ−N − 1]P+−} (ℓ).(4.3)
We can now return to the top frame of figure 2 which depicts 〈∆Wk〉∞. As we see,
the highest value of expected market wealth increments is achieved for a level of q
close to 0.6. Specifically, the maximum value, 3.9128, is achieved for q = 0.56 and
the invariant measure is not unique, because η2(59) ∈ A2. On the other hand the
second highest value, 3.9102, is achieved for q = 0.62 and the invariant measure
is unique. In fact, with the exception of narrow islands restricted to q < 0.3, the
market expects to make money under the conditions in figure 2.
We proceed to iterate this computation of the optimal level of strategic interac-
tion q∗ and the resulting maximum attainable expected market wealth increment
〈∆Wk〉∗∞ as we vary α and γ (figure 7). We can make the following observations
regarding the sensitivity of the expected market wealth increments to changes in
the impact function asymmetry (γ) and the overall coupling constant (α):
• For all values of γ, the optimal choice of Strategic interaction level q leads
to non-negative expected wealth increments for the market at large.
• When the impact function is symmetric (γ = −1), the market can no
longer make positive returns. Thus it is the impact function asymmetry
that sustains positive expectations of broad market returns.
• Modest positive impact asymmetry (incremental buy has slightly more ef-
fect than incremental sell) leads to the minimum desirable amount of strate-
gic interaction.
• As the global coupling constant is increased, more strategic interaction is
desirable while the attainable returns decrease.
• When the coupling constant is increased beyond a sufficiently high value
(around 5.9 for the example shown in figure 7), all agents act exclusively
strategically.
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Figure 7. Sensitivity of q∗ and resulting 〈∆Wk〉∗∞ to changes in
α (left) and γ (right) (α = 5 for the left panel, γ = −0.9 for the
right panel, N = 128 and d = 2 throughout).
Consider now the majority opinion of the agents,
M (Tk) =
∑
y∈Y
sgn (E [W (y, Tk)−W (y, Tk−1) |Bk−1 ]) .
Combining (4.1) and (4.2) we arrive at the following observation:
Theorem 4.1. When the market experiences a supermartingale, so does the ma-
jority of the agents. There exist situations when the market disagrees with the
majority of the agents, in the sense that their respective expected wealth increments
have opposite signs. When the market disagrees with the majority, the market is
experiencing a submartingale.
Thus, there are cases when coordination of the agents to achieve a ‘common
objective’ is desirable over individual optimization of their respective strategic in-
teraction strengths.
5. Conclusions and Next Steps
In this paper we presented a two-dimensional spin market model. The first spin
dimension represents the agents’ decision to buy or sell, as in earlier models. The
second spin dimension encodes a subset of supply/demand imbalance levels which
are deemed to be desirable, because they lead the agent under consideration to
experience a submartingale wealth process.
We extended the analysis from [11] to describe the invariant measure of this novel
process. Our principal findings are that, under certain conditions the resulting
invariant measure is not unique, depending sensitively on initial conditions. We
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interpret this behavior as a type of ‘fad dynamic’. Also, there exist conditions
under which the market disagrees with the majority of the agents in its assessment
of the desirability of certain imbalance levels. Thus, coordination across the agents
adds value beyond that attainable by individual optimization by the agents.
It is natural to extend further our model by allowing each agent to adjust their
degree of strategic interaction (q) dynamically as they experience the process. The
resulting evolutionary game could provide insight into periodic imbalance attrac-
tors. On the other hand, the thermodynamic limit (N → ∞) of this process is
likely to provide estimates of the occupation density around individual imbalance
levels.
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